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COMMONWEALTH v. KATER 
In Commonwealth v. Kater,l the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts formulated a rule of per se inadmissibility of testi­
mony given by a witness who has been hypnotized concerning facts 
not recollected before hypnosis. 2 The court held that "hypnosis sim­
ply lacks general acceptability by experts in the field as a reliable 
method of enhancing the memory of a witness."3 Furthermore, the 
court adopted various procedures for assessing the reliability of testi­
mony obtained from a witness's prehypnotic memory and for con­
ducting hypnotic sessions involving potential witnesses.4 
Kater was tried and convicted of first degree murder and of kid­
napping a teenage girts The prosecution obtained the conviction 
based upon circumstantial evidence which included hypnotically 
aided testimony.6 At trial, the prosecution failed to inform the court 
that four of its witnesses had been hypnotized. Believing that two of 
the four witnesses had been subjects of hypnosis, the defense counsel 
objected to the admissibility of their testimony.1 After a preliminary 
examination of the witnesses, the judge decided to admit their 
testimony.8 
On appeal, the defendant filed a motion for leave to file a mo­
tion for a new trial. Upon the recommendation of a single justice, 
the supreme judicial court remitted the motion to the trial court to 
I. 388 Mass. 519,447 N.E.2d 1190 (1983). 
2. Id. at 520, 447 N.E.2d at 1193. It is essential to note that this holding does not 
disqualify a witness who has undergone hypnosis from testifying. It allows a witness to 
testify as to facts contained in his or her prehypnotic memory but does not permit a 
witness to color that testimony with any facts which became "known" as a result of the 
hypnotic session. Id. at 529, 447 N.E.2d at 1197. 
Hypnotism has been defined as the "production of a sleeplike condition in a person 
who is then very susceptible to suggestion and who acts only if told to do so." OXFORD 
AMERICAN DICTIONARY 322 (1980). 
3. 388 Mass. at 520-21, 447 N.E.2d at 1193. 
4. Id. at 529-31,447 N.E.2d at 1197-98. 
5. Id. at 520, 447 N.E.2d at 1192. 
6. Id. at 522-23, 447 N.E.2d at 1193-94. The Kaler court defined hypnotically 
aided testimony as testimony first made available from a witness after hypnosis. Id. at 
520, 447 N.E.2d at 1192-93. 
7. Id. at 523, 447 N.E.2d at 1194. Sheila Berry and Helena McCoy had been sub­
jects of hypnotic sessions twice. Id. 
8. Id. 
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decide the issue of a new trial. At the hearing on that motion, the 
judge declined to establish whether or not the four witnesses had 
actually been hypnotized despite the fact that the expert testimony 
on hypnosis, offered solely by the defendant, indicated that at least 
three of the prosecution's witnesses had been hypnotized.9 The rec­
ord of the trial judge's findings, however, revealed that the hypnotic 
sessions were conducted in a haphazard manner-i.e. no record was 
kept as to (1) what knowledge each witness possessed prior to hypno­
sis, (2) what knowledge the hypnotist possessed about the crime, and 
(3) what environment existed prior to and during each session. 1O In 
denying the defendant's motion for a new trial, the judge stated that 
"the defendant failed to establish that the 'hypnotic' sessions devel­
oped any additional substantial or material facts or changes in testi­
mony and that the testimony of Helena McCoy and Sheila Berry was 
the product of their memory as opposed to the product of 
hypnosis." II 
Many courts have recognized the use of hypnosis for the pur­
poses of memory enhancement and investigation in developing evi­
dence admissible at trial. I2 These courts have held that hypnosis 
affects the credibility, but not the admissibility, of testimony. 13 It is 
argued that although a witness's present memory can be impaired by 
hypnosis, the dangers of suggestion and confabulation14 are tem­
9. Id. at 524, 447 N.E.2d at 1194. The trial judge doubted that an hypnotic session 
occurred since the "hypnotist" was a police officer whose qualifications were almost non­
existent. When the police officer attempted to testify that the witnesses were hypnotized, 
the judge did not permit him to do so. Id. 
10. /d. 
II. /d. at 524, 447 N.E.2d at 1194-95. 
12. E.g., United States v. Awkward, 597 F.2d 667,669 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,444 
U.S. 885 (1979); United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193, 198-99 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,439 
U.S. 1006 (1978); Kline v. Ford Motor Co., 523 F.2d 1067, 1070 (9th Cir. 1975); United 
States v. Narciso, 446 F. Supp. 252, 281-82 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Clark v. State, 379 So. 2d 
372, 375 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); People v. Smrekar, 68 Ill. App. 3d 379, 386, 385 
N.E.2d 848, 853-54 (1979); State v. McQueen, 295 N.C. 96, 119,244 S.E.2d 414, 427-28 
(1978); State v. Jorgenson, 8 Or. App. 1,8-9,492 P.2d 312, 315 (1971). 
13. See cases cited supra note 12. 
14. For an explanation of these dangers, see State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 538-39, 432 
A.2d 86, 91-93 (1981) (quoting Orne, The Use and Misuse ofHypnosis in Court, 27 INT'L 
J. 	CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 311, 317-18 (1979». 
The hypnotic suggestion to relive a past event, particularly when accompa­
nied by questions about specific details, puts pressure on the subject to provide 
information for which few, if any, actual memories are available. This situation 
may jog the subject's memory and produce some increased recall, but it will 
also cause him to fill in details that are plausible but consist of memories or 
fantasies from other times. It is extremely difficult to know which aspects of 
hypnotically aided recall are historically accurate and which aspects have been 
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pered by the opportunity to cross-examine the witness. IS 
When confronted for the first time with the question of admissi­
bility of hypnotically aided testimony, the supreme judicial court, in 
Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 16 failed to take a definitive stance on 
the issue. Commonwealth v. A Juvenile involved a rape victim who 
was initially unable to accurately identify her assailant. 17 After be­
ing hypnotized by a Boston police officer, the victim was then able to 
assist another detective in sketching a composite picture. This re­
sulted in subsequent identifications by the victim and eventual arrest 
of the defendant. 18 The absence of certain factual findings l9 by the 
trial court concerning the victim's identification testimony and the 
possible suggestiveness of the hypnotic session led the court to re­
frain from deciding the case and the legal issues contained therein. 
The court held, however, that because hypnotically induced testi­
confabulated. . . . Subjects will use prior information and cues in an inconsis­
tent and unpredictable fashion; in some instances such information is incorpo­
rated in what is confabulated, while in others the hypnotic recall may be 
virtually unaffected. 
As a consequence of these limitations, hypnosis may be useful in some 
instances to help bring back forgotten memories following an accident or a 
crime while in others a witness might, with the same conviction, produce infor­
mation that is totally inaccurate. . .. As long as this material is subject to 
independent verification, its utility is considerable and the risk attached to the 
procedure is minimal. There is no way, however, by which anyone--even a 
psychologist or psychiatrist with extensive training in the field of hypnosis--..:can 
for any particular piece of information determine whether it is an actual mem­
ory versus a confabulation unless there is independent verification. 
Id. (emphasis in original). See generally Diamond, Inherent Problems in the Use ofPre­
trial Hypnosis on a Prospective Witness, 68 CAL. L. REV. 313 (1980); Specter & Foster, 
Admissibility ofHypnotic Statements: Is the Law ofEvidence Susceptible? 38 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 567 (1977). 
15. See, e.g., United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193, 198 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 
U.S. 1006 (1978) (the prosecution impeached a defense witness with his post-hypnotic 
statements); State v. McQueen, 295 N.C. 96, 120-21,244 S.E.2d 414, 428 (1978) (failure to 
cross-examine witness who had undergone hypnosis removed the defense's chance to 
render the witness's testimony inadmissible or discredited); State v. Jorgenson, 8 Or. 
App. 1,8-9,492 P.2d 312, 315 (1971) (fact that witness had been subjected to hypnosis 
and administration of sodium amy tal found not to be a basis for disallowing testimony 
since the witness underwent prolonged and rigorous cross-examination by defense coun­
sel before the jury). But see Polk v. State, 48 Md. App. 382, 427 A.2d 1041 (1981) (over­
turning Harding v. State, 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302 (1967), cert. denied, 252 Md. 731, 
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1969) which ~epresented the leading opinion that fact of hyp­
nosis affects credibility and weight, not admissibility). 
16. 381 Mass. 727, 412 N.E.2d 339 (1980). 
17. Id. at 728, 412 N.E.2d at 340. 
18. /d. 
19. The police officer who hypnotized the victim did not record the session nor the 
victim's pre-hypnotic memory. There was also controversy regarding whether or not the 
other policeman who assembled the composite picture knew the defendant. Id. 
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mony is inherently suggestive and because the surrounding circum­
stances of the hypnotic session are within the knowledge of the 
Commonwealth, the admissibility of such testimony should be con­
ditioned upon a showing by the Commonwealth of its reliability.20 
In applying Commonwealth v. A Juvenile to the procedural facts of 
Kater ,21 the supreme judicial court interpreted the trial judge's deci­
sion as having misplaced the burden of proof placed upon the de­
fense in that it required the defense to demonstrate that the 
hypnotically aided testimony proffered by the prosecution was 
reliable.22 
Having resolved the burden of proof issue, the supreme judicial 
court in Kater sought to establish a standard for determining the ad­
missibility of such evidence. The supreme judicial court had stated 
in Commonwealth v. A Juvenile that it would consider adopting a 
modified version of the test used in Frye v. United States 23 to ascer­
tain the admissibility of any expert testimony based upon scientific 
principles or techniques.24 The Frye test provides that admission of 
such evidence is contingent upon whether the scientific principle or 
technique employed "is sufficiently established to have gained gen­
eral acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs."25 In 
adopting this test, the Kater court did not attempt to analogize hyp­
nosis to other conventional scientific processes,26 but rather the court 
found the evidentiary reasoning underlying the Frye test to apply to 
the situation at hand.27 The Kater court reasoned that when the situ­
ation is such that the jurors cannot realistically evaluate a principle 
or process because it is outside their realm of common knowledge or 
experience, the assistance of expert testimony is essential to their for­
mulation of an informed decision.28 Consequently, the party who is 
the proponent of hypnotically induced testimony must show that 
20. Id. at 734, 412 N.E.2d at 344. 
21. Although the holding of Commonwealth v. A Juvenile was in effect, the trial 
judge in Kater failed to apply it. 
22. Kater, 388 Mass. at 524, 447 N.E.2d at 1195. 
23. 293 F. 10\3 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
24. 381 Mass. at 732, 412 N.E.2d at 342-43. 
25. Frye, 293 F. at 1014. 
26. The prosecution attempted to argue that the Frye test should not apply to hyp­
nosis cases because Frye deals only with psychological or physiological scientific 
processes. 
27. 388 Mass. at 526, 447 N.E.2d at 1195. 
28. The court did not explicitly state this proposition; however, when reading the 
reasoning behind the Frye test in conjunction with the Kater court's concern for whether 
a jury "can realistically evaluate the effect of hypnosis," one is lead to this conclusion. 
/d. at 526, 447 N.E.2d at 1195-96. 
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there exists general acceptance among experts depicting hypnosis as 
a reliable means of refreshing recall.29 In light of the general 
skeptcisim among experts30 as to the reliability of such testimony, 
the Kater court ruled that testimony induced by hypnosis is 
inadmissible.31 
While the court held that hypnotically aided testimony was 
inadmissible, the court's holding did not preclude a witness from tes­
tifying as to facts remembered before hypnosis.32 In order to pre­
serve a witness's prehypnotic testimony, the court set forth the 
following procedural safeguards to be applied flexibly: 
(1) 	 The hypnotic session should be conducted by a licensed psy­
chiatrist or psychologist trained in the use of hypnosis.33 
(2) 	 The qualified professional conducting the hypnotic session 
should be independent of and not responsible to the prosecu­
tor, investigator or the defense. 
(3) 	 Any information given to the hypnotic session must be in 
written form so that subsequently the extent of the informa­
tion the subject received from the hypnotist may be 
determined. 
(4) 	 Before induction of hypnosis, the hypnotist should obtain 
29. Id. at 527,447 N.E.2d at 1196. A few courts have adopted the Frye approach 
as requiring each party to offer expert testimony on the effects of hypnosis in each partic­
ular case. See State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 538, 432 A.2d 86, 92 (1981) (hypnosis satisfies 
Frye in certain instances). For a thorough analysis of the Hurd interpretation see Note, 
Safeguarding Admissibility afHypnotically Enhanced Testimony, 5 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 
281 (1982); see also State v. Beacham, 97 N. M. 682, 643 P.2d 246 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981) 
(post-hypnotic recollections admissible when proper foundation has first established the 
reliability of hypnotic session). 
30. The Kater court declined to cite the opinions of many experts concluding that 
hypnotically aided testimony is unreliable. The court did however mention the inherent 
dangers associated with hypnosis as expressed by Dr. Orne, see supra note 14, adding 
that previously hypnotized witnesses have a tendency to be immune from meaningful 
cross-examination. 388 Mass. at 528, 447 N.E.2d at 1196. 
31. 388 Mass. at 527-28, 447 N.E.2d 1196-97. Most of the courts which have re­
cently held hypnotically induced testimony inadmissible have interpreted the Frye stan­
dard in this manner. See, e.g., State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 768-71 (Minn. 1980); 
People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18,40,641 P.2d 775, 787, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 255-56, cert. 
denied, 103 S. Ct. 13 (1982); People v. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d 523, 542-44, 453 N.E.2d 484, 
494-95, 466 N.Y.S.2d 255, 265-66 (1983). 
32. 388 Mass. at 528-29, 447 N.E.2d at 1197. The court recognized two situations 
in which it would not find evidence procured through the use of hypnosis inadmissible: 
I) where a person suffers loss of memory due to a physical trauma; and 2) where the 
evidence is discovered as a result of the hypnotism of a witness. Id. at 528-29 n.6, 447 
N.E.2d at 1197 n.6. 
33. The Kater court recognized that there may be situations when an individual 
qualified in the use of hypnosis would suffice. 388 Mass. at 530 n.8, 447 N.E.2d at 1198 
n.8. 
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from the subject a detailed description of the facts as the sub­
ject remembers them, carefully avoiding adding any new ele­
ments to the witness's description of the events. 
(5) 	 All contacts between the hypnotist and the subject should be 
recorded so that a permanent record is available for compari­
son and study to establish that the witness has not received 
information or suggestion which might later be reported as 
having been first described by the subject during hypnosis. 
Videotape should be employed if possible, but should not be 
mandatory. 
(6) 	 Only the hypnotist and the subject should be present during 
any phase of the hypnotic session, including the prehypnotic 
testing and post-hypnotic interview. 
(7) 	 Opposing counsel must raise a timely objection to the intro­
duction of testimony procured through hypnosis. 
(8) 	 Opposing counsel must be given an opportunity to show the 
possible effects of hypnosis and the way in which the particu­
lar session was conducted on the witness's testimony and 
sense of certainty. 
(9) 	 Opposing counsel must be entitled to an instruction to the 
jury that in assessing the credibility of any such witness they 
may consider the consequences of (a) the fact that a witness 
underwent questioning while hypnotized and (b) the circum­
stances under which the hypnotic session was conducted.34 
In developing these guidelines, the court acknowledged that the 
decision would have a deterrent effect on the use of hypnosis for the 
purposes of developing testimony against a criminal defendant. 35 
The court emphasized, however, that its decision was based upon the 
scientific community's present lack of conclusive evidence with re­
gard to the reliability of hypnosis as a memory stimulant.36 Byex­
cluding only the testimony which is hypnotically induced, the court 
safeguarded the instrumental role hypnosis might play in the investi­
gative process. 
Patricia J. Nowak 
34. The first six guidelines can be found in Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 381 Mass. 
at 732, 412 N.E.2d at 343. The last three can be found in Kater, 388 Mass. at 530-31, 447 
N.E.2d at 1198. 
35. 	 Kater, 388 Mass. at 531, 447 N.E.2d at 1199. 
36. Id. 
